Early morning sunlight filters through the dense leaves of the Peepal tree. Mats are carefully spread in a semicircle where the students sit, waiting with attentive silence. Before Charaka, the objects are arranged with deliberate simplicity: a shallow bowl filled with golden ghee, a smooth river stone, a small heap of cooked rice, and beside it, raw grains still in their husk.
Classifying What We Think Exists
Charaka: Before we speak of an organ such as the heart, an herb such as Pippalī, or food such as cooked rice, we must take a step back. Tell me, my students, how do we identify and classify what exists in this universe?
Aaruni: By naming the things we see, Master. A stone, a star, a tree, a cow, a man.
Charaka: Good, but naming is not yet knowing. When you say “tree” what do you mean? The colour? The girth? The height? The smell of its flowers? The taste of its fruit? Or, all of these together?
Kumara: It is all of these, Master. The tree has a form. It grows. It gives flowers and fruit. The flowers have specific smells and colours, and its fruits have specific tastes. It also gives shelter to birds.
Charaka: Then already you are mixing up what a thing is, what properties it has, how it behaves, and what utility it may have. If we are to practice medicine with precision, we must first learn to sort what we think exists into categories, and we must have good reasons to support the categories that we postulate.
Kumara: Does that mean we classify everything that can be perceived, such as the colour of a fruit, the height of a tree, or the sweetness of a fruit?
Charaka: No! It is more than that! We classify everything that can be ‘conceived or spoken of’. Whatever is knowable is thought to exist. Existence does not mean material existence. This we call ontology.
Kumara: By what name we call such an idea of ‘entities that exist’ in Ayurveda? Does it have a name?
Charaka: Yes, we call this group Padārtha: that which can be conceived or spoken of. Our current system says that there are six categories of Padārtha. Padārtha is the parent category. Others are sub-categories.
Kumara: What do we mean by a ‘parent category’ and a ‘sub-category’?
Charaka: When we include certain entities under one sub-category, all members of this sub-category should share something in common with the parent category.
Aaruni: Is it like saying that ‘plants’ is a parent category and different trees, shrubs, herbs and grass form sub-categories of ‘plants?’ And animals would form a different category. And both plants and animals would be sub-categories of life forms.
Kumara: And Mango tree and Ficus trees are the members of the sub-category of ‘Trees’?
Charaka: Well-articulated. Further, though a category can share more than one common feature, it cannot have mutually conflicting features as commonalities.
Kumara: It means that the subcategory of a shrub can have features such as ‘flowering, fruit bearing, not seed bearing’, but cannot have combined features such as ‘flowering, and not flowering’ or ‘seed-bearing, and not seed-bearing’. Am I right?
Charaka: Exactly: within a dimension or parameter, a category cannot contain logically contradictory combinations. That is the rule that we follow. Now we shall have a look at the sub-categories of Padārtha. All subcategories are knowable or conceivable. Hence all share this commonality with Padārtha.
Aaruni: This makes sense. What are these sub-categories?
Charaka: According to our current knowledge, they are: Dravya (substance: real or postulated), Guṇa (property), Karma (function), Sāmānya (similarity), Viśeṣa (difference), and Samavāya (inseparable relationship). Each helps us understand a different face of reality. Let us unfold them one by one.
Aaruni: Would you please explain them by citing examples, Master?
Charaka: Think of it this way: Dravya, normally translated as substance, is the base, that can be understood to have properties and functions, Guṇa and Karma. However, remember, there is no equivalent term for Dravya in other languages. It can stand for real material entity or can also stand for a postulated entity. Guṇa, property, makes a Dravya knowable by sight, taste, touch, smell, or sound, or by other intellectual means. Karma is the natural tendency of a Dravya to act in a particular way. These three, dravya, guṇa and karma cannot be separated, for each exists with the others.
Aaruni: You say Dravya is a substance, but you also say that it may be knowable by intellectual means other than what our senses can perceive. I find this a bit confusing.
Charaka: This is a good question that confuses even the best scholars of our time. Dravya need not necessarily mean a material substance. It can be an entity that we postulate.
Aaruni: Does it mean that we can postulate anything, and it will be called a Dravya?
Charaka: No. We should be able to describe its properties and functions, using which we should be able to explain some phenomena and predict the logical consequences. This is called explanatory power and predictive utility. If you remember, we discussed this in the context of Ojas. It is a Dravya though it does not have material existence.
Aaruni: In that case what characteristics do the other three categories have?
Charaka: They explain the relations in general. When a thing causes an increase in something that is similar, we call that Sāmānya (augmentation because of commonality). For example, if you pour water into a pot that has some milk, the volume of the contents inside the pot increases. This is because of similarity. Water and milk: both are liquids. They are similar.
Kumara: What is Viśeṣa in that case? Just the opposite?
Charaka: Yes, it denotes ‘reduction because of opposition’. Just as water kept on a burning stove evaporates because they are opposites: fire is hot and water is cool. Water extinguishes fire and fire causes evaporation of water.
Aaruni: I don’t understand. Can’t water be hot? Fire cannot be cold, but why rule out hot water?
Charaka: That is a fair point to consider. But imagine, when you boil hot water kept in a pot over a stove, doesn’t it evaporate? It does. It is because hotness and coldness are not the only two properties that operate here. Fire by nature is opposite to water by virtue of its properties such as dryness, lightness, and sharpness, whereas water is moist, heavy, and fluid. These contrasting qualities meet, and by that opposition water is reduced through evaporation. Even if both can appear hot, their inner properties remain contrary, and it is this viśeṣa, the opposition of qualities, that brings about reduction.
Kumara: What is Samavāya?
Charaka: Because properties (Guṇa) and functions (Karma) cannot float free of substance, we recognize an inseparable bond between them, called Samavāya (inseparability). Together, these six categories let us describe whatever exists, not just what we see, but also what we infer, postulate, or explain.
Kumara: Then, Master, are the objects in front of us, ghee, stone, cooked rice, raw grain, all examples of Dravya? You just told us that dravya is that which carries properties and functions. Yet I wonder, should we call only the underlying substances dravya, or also the objects prepared out of them? For example, marble is a substance, but a carved idol of marble is an object. Metal is a substance, but ornaments are objects. Leaves are substances, but when pounded they become Kalka, paste. Are all these still dravya?
Charaka: You raise a subtle question. In Ayurveda, dravya refers to the fundamental substrate that bears properties (guṇa) and functions (karma). Whether in the form of ghee, stone, rice, or grain, all are dravyas because they possess properties and can produce effects. The distinction you make between “substance” and “object” concerns form and arrangement, but Ayurveda sees both as modes of dravya. A leaf remains dravya whether whole, crushed or made into paste. The form may change, but as long as it has qualities and functions, it is counted as dravya. That is why we use herbs in many forms—powder, paste, juice, decoction, and so on. When we process a Dravya, its properties, function, and form may change, but still, it is Dravya.
Aaruni: What about the air around us that can be felt through touch, when a breeze makes us feel it? Though it doesn’t have a visible form, is it still a Dravya?
Charaka: Yes, air could be dry or slightly moist depending on the season but has a function of being able to kindle the fire. In the absence of air, fire cannot burn wood. Hence dryness is its property and ‘ability to kindle the fire’ is its function. That is why each Dravya has Guṇa and Karma. Oil possesses the ability to lubricate a wheel of a chariot, irrespective of whether it is used in the chariot wheel or not. We call lubrication, its Karma. The potential action that is inherent to a Dravya. We also call it ‘function’.
Bhargava: Then, Master, do Vāta, Pitta, Kapha also count as Dravyas?
Charaka: You touch upon a delicate matter. Many profound scholars get confused with this question. Let me clarify this for you today. Yes, in our framework they are Dravya, for they have been postulated to have Guṇa and Karma. But unlike ghee or stone, they are not directly perceivable through our senses.
Bhargava: Master, you showed us the yellowish green substance that was expelled during therapeutic emesis, and you said it was Pitta.
Charaka: This is precisely the cause for confusion. Though they appear as material substances- Kapha as mucus and Pitta as bile, they are not to be confused with Doṣa. They are Mala (wastes).
Kumara: You told us that Pitta is Mala of Rakta. I remember. But what about Kapha?
Charaka: Kapha is Mala of Rasa Dhātu. It is because both are fluids.
Bhargava: In that case why do we say that there are tubes and vessels that carry Vāta, Pitta and Kapha? Can we see them in the cadaver during dissection?
Charaka: No, you cannot see these vessels and tubes. They are proposed for the sake of highlighting the fact that a Doṣa can have its effects shown all over the body. These tubes are postulated entities. We should not take them for real.
Bhargava: So our texts may contain some confusing details and potential errors. We may have to refine them and correct them. Is that what you mean?
Charaka: Yes, you are right. Sometimes many terms are used without clear context and that makes understanding of the subject difficult. We should not be perpetuating those confusions. We should be careful when we use these terms and must try to bring clarity.
Aaruni: I get that. But if something is not directly seen, why are we postulating it? Aren’t we making only an assumption?
Charaka: An excellent question. If we directly perceive something, it is Pratyakṣa (what we observe). If we infer correctly from repeated observations, we call it Anumāna (inference). For example, if I hear the cawing of a crow, I will infer that the colour of the crow is black, even though I have not seen the crow. If I tell you that I saw a crow, you will infer that the colour of the crow that I saw was black. This is because both you and I have seen thousands of crows in the past, and they were always black. Hence it is reasonable to infer that the unseen crow must also be black. This is inference, and inference should lead to valid conclusions. If we speak without any such basis, it is only assumption. If we admit something for its explanatory power, though unseen, it is a postulate, awaiting testing. Thus, we classify carefully even our reasoning. This is about how we justify our knowledge. This is known as Pramāna, epistemology. We shall take this up in another lesson.
The students nod, sensing the seriousness of precision. Charaka pauses, then continues.
Charaka: Remember: categories are not eternal truths, but they help us approach the truth. The lists given under each category are not final and complete. There is always room for modification, deletion and addition. Even you may need to shift some members from one list to another. That is always possible. No human knowledge is final.
(After a pause, he continues).
Charaka: We shall continue the discussion after spreading the herbs we collected yesterday on mats in the shade to dry. Come, let us take a break.
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Dravya and Guṇa
The rising sun filters through the leaves. Charaka gestures toward the ghee, stone, rice, and grain again.
Charaka: We said that Dravya (substance) is the base of reality. But tell me, if I present this bowl of ghee, how do you know it is ghee and not water?
Aaruni: By its smoothness, its thickness, its smell and taste.
Charaka: Yes, these are Guṇas (properties). Without Guṇa, a Dravya cannot be recognized.
Aaruni: How many such Dravyas exist in the universe, Master? Is there a list?
Charaka: In our system, nine Dravyas are counted in total: all five Mahābhūta-s, time, directions, self, and mind.
Kumara: I thought Dravyas must be infinite because we can see millions of things around us: a rabbit, a centipede, a parakeet, a cow, a tree, grass, mud, river, sun, moon and what not!
Charaka: All dravya may be understood as composed of the nine fundamental Dravya-s, present in varying proportions.
Kumara: Then there must be a way to distinguish the basic component units from the products formed out of them. Calling both dravya would be confusing.
Charaka: Indeed. The nine are called kāraṇa dravya, the causal substances. The countless products that arise through their permutations and combinations are called kārya dravya, the resultant substances. But remember: all kārya Dravyas need not be made up of all nine causal substances.
Aaruni: Doṣa, Agni, Ojas, and such others, in that case must be kārya dravya. Am I correct?
Charaka: You are right to inquire. Doṣa, Agni, Ojas, and the like are indeed kārya dravya, for they are thought to be composed of the mahābhūtas. Yet remember, they are not tangible in the way stone or water is. They are postulated entities, formulated for explanatory utility, to make sense of function, balance, and disturbance in the body. They have predictive utility in understanding a disease and outcome in response to specific treatment.
Bhargava: You told us in the beginning that living beings possess self (Ātman) and non-living beings possess only five mahābhūta-s in different proportions. But you did not tell us about mind, directions, time and self? This is a bit difficult to grasp, Master!
Charaka: The specific reference to existence of any Dravya can be explained only with the help of direction and time. They determine ‘when’ and ‘where’ does a thing exist.
Bhargava: What about self and mind?
Charaka: Self and mind are applicable for only living beings. Remember: for all practical purposes, we take all drvyas to be composed of five mahābhūta-s. Among living beings, we add ‘self’ as the sixth component. The others like time, direction and mind are treated as kāraṇa dravya for theoretical purposes.
Aaruni: What do we mean by self? I need some clarity here. Is it the same as Cetanā?
Charaka: The self refers to the Ātman, the eternal and unchanging essence distinct from the body and mind. Sometimes Ātman is also referred to as Cetanā (consciousness), but it is slightly different, as Ātman denotes the enduring self while Cetanā represents the active awareness or consciousness that arises from it. The self is thus the true identity of a person beyond physical and mental states.
Bhargava: How can time be a Dravya? It is a bit confusing.
Charaka: Well, time has properties and functions. It brings about sequences such as before and after, and makes change perceivable. Without time there would be no distinction between past, present, and future. Actions unfold in time, and effects appear only after causes when time allows. This is the reason why time is counted among the nine dravya. This reminds us that timely intervention is essential in treatment. That’s it.
Bhargava: I think mind should have been a property of self, and not a Dravya in itself.
Charaka: Ayurveda considers self as an independent entity. Mind is thought to connect other sensory organs with the self. Hence mind too is considered an independent entity. However, remember, both self and mind are postulated entities. They have got explanatory power, but no physical existence. Hence it is immaterial if they are counted under Dravya or elsewhere.
Aaruni: That makes sense. What I grasp in essence is that all non-living beings are composed of five Mahābhūta-s whereas living beings are composed of one additional component, Self (Ātman). For all practical purposes, this is what is important. Am I right?
Charaka: Yes. You have grasped it correctly.
Aaruni: How do we classify guṇa? Can we count them? If so, how many of them are there?
Charaka: We consider forty-one in all. But remember, they are counted based on pragmatism, not on absolute theoretical accuracy. They are often grouped for the sake of convenience. This number need not be final. As new knowledge arrives, the list needs to be updated from time to time. First group of Guṇas is made up of what we can directly perceive.
Aaruni: Oh, then it must be the group comprising of śabda (sound), sparśa (touch), rūpa (form), rasa (taste) and gandha (smell)?
Charaka: Yes, they are all Guṇas. They make substances perceivable through the senses.
Kumara (objecting): But we read that each rasa has properties of its own. For example, madhura rasa (sweet taste) is cold (śīta), heavy (guru), and unctuous (snigdha). If a Guṇa itself has other Guṇa, does it not behave like a Dravya?
Charaka: A valid objection! This is a confusion that has been acknowledged explicitly in our tradition. Strictly, rasa is a Guṇa. The properties ascribed to each Rasa are in reality those of the Dravya that possesses it. This again, is a pragmatic approach. You must accept that our categories could be overlapping. What matters is whether these categories let us explain health, predict disease, and design treatment.
Charaka pauses, letting the students reflect.
Charaka: Thus, remember: some Guṇa-s are physical and sensed directly, some are relational, some are grasped through intellect. There is overlap. There is debate. But each plays a role in making Dravya knowable and usable in practice.
Charaka places the stone on Bhargava’s palm.
Charaka: Let me ask you: if I place this stone on your palm, what properties do you sense?
Bhargava: It is heavy, hard, and smooth.
Charaka: Yes. Those properties belong to the second group, known as Gurvādiguṇa, the list starting with Guru. This group includes properties like heavy (guru) and light (laghu), oily (snigdha) and dry (rukṣa), cold (śīta) and hot (uṣṇa), stable (sthira) and mobile (cala), soft (mṛdu) and hard (kaṭhina), smooth (ślakṣṇa) and rough (khara), subtle (sūkṣma) and gross (sthūla), viscous (sandra) and clear (viśada). These could be perceived directly by the senses, or by inference. We will discuss this in upcoming sessions.
Aaruni: That is already many. What of the rest?
Charaka: There is a third cluster called the Parādi-guṇa, the series beginning with para. These are not tactile like heaviness or softness but are understood by the mind. They include para (priority, precedence), apara (posteriority, succession), yukti (rational coordination), saṅkhyā (number), saṃyoga (conjunction), vibhāga (disjunction), parimāṇa (magnitude, measurement), pṛthaktva (distinctness), saṃskāra (processing), and abhyāsa (habitual repetition).
Kumara: I find this interesting. Saṅkhyā, numbers? Do you mean that numbers we use for counting do not exist as Dravya, but as guṇa?
Charaka: Yes, because they are used as adjectives. Ten cows, five mountains and so on. Further, they do not have their own properties or functions. Hence, they are aptly included under guṇa category.
Kumara: But Master, saṃyoga and vibhāga, joining and separation, are they not the results of actions? Why are they counted among properties (guṇas) rather than actions (karmas)?
Charaka: You reason well, Kumara. They indeed arise from motion. When you lift a pot from the floor and place it on the stove, separation (vibhāga) occurs with respect to the floor and conjunction (saṃyoga) with respect to the stove. Yet, once produced, these are no longer motions but states: relations that describe how one substance stands to another. Hence, they are guṇas, not karmas.
Kumara: But, Master, since joining and separation involve two things, how can they be properties of one substance?
Charaka: Each relation inheres separately. The pot has a saṃyoga with the stove, and the stove has a saṃyoga with the pot. There are thus two corresponding relational qualities, each residing in one substance. They are born of action but remain as static attributes, qualifying their respective substances.
Kumara: What about parimāṇa (magnitude/ measurement), pṛthaktva (distinctness), para (priority/ precedence), and apara (posteriority/ succession)?
Charaka: Parimāṇa means measure. For example, length is measured in aṅgula and volume in añjali. When suffixed with numbers they give accuracy, as in ten añjali, fifteen aṅgula, and so on. Pṛthaktva is distinctness. For example, Harītakī is different from Pippalī because of distinctness. Para and apara stand for priority and succession. For instance, having worms inside the belly may be the primary cause (para) of pāṇḍu, while eating food with unwashed hands after touching mud may be a secondary cause (apara).
Kumara: Master, what about yukti? Is it not a pramāṇa, a means of arriving at valid knowledge? Should it not be treated under epistemology rather than ontology? Why is it listed here among the guṇas?
Charaka: A good doubt. In epistemology, yukti indeed functions as a means of valid inference. But here it is spoken of in another sense, as an ontological property that exists in multiple components that act as a single unit. Just as number and magnitude are not instruments of knowing but attributes of entities, so too yukti here denotes the order, coordination, and purposeful arrangement within dravya. Thus, in ontology it is counted as a guṇa, while in epistemology it serves as a means. The same term points to two distinct roles.
Kumara: Then, Master, could you give an example of yukti as a guṇa? It is easier for me to see how number or magnitude are properties, but less clear with yukti.
Charaka: Consider the body. The heart, lungs, blood, and breath act in coordination. Their mutual adjustment and timely sequence is yukti as a guṇa, the inherent order that sustains life.
Aaruṇi: So more than one Dravya is required for Yukti to be observed. Am I correct?
Charaka: Yes. Even to understand Pṛthaktva, Saṃyoga and Vibhāga more than one Dravya is required.
Aaruni: I still don’t get what is the difference between Pṛthaktva, (distinctness) and Vibhāga (separatedness). Both sound similar?
Charaka: To be distinct (pṛthak) is not the same as being separated (vibhakta). Distinctness is an intrinsic difference that exists even when two entities are not spatially apart, whereas separation (vibhāga) arises when entities that were once conjoined become disjoined in space or contact.
Aaruni: Now this is clear. What are saṃskāra and abhyāsa?
Charaka: Saṃskāra is that which brings about transformation in the properties of a dravya. When a substance undergoes heating, pounding, fermenting, or purification, its qualities change because of saṃskāra. For example, when milk is boiled it becomes laghu, lighter to digest. Abhyāsa is repeated practice.
Kumara: But if saṃskāra changes guṇas, should it not be counted as a karma (action)?
Charaka: The change itself, Kumara, arises from the action of heat, which is karma. Yet what remains after the heating stops is saṃskāra. It is the residual modification left by action, not the action itself. Saṃskāra does not move or act; it abides as a quality within the substance, preparing it for future transformations. Hence, although it is produced by karma and capable of altering other guṇas, it is itself an enduring guṇa, not a karma.
Kumara: But isn’t this debatable?
Charaka (concluding): Your point is sound. There is indeed some overlap here, and the line is not always sharp. Some categories such as saṃyoga, vibhāga, and saṃskāra invite debate about whether they belong with guṇas or karmas. Yet, in practice, it makes little difference, for what matters is understanding their roles in real world scenarios.
Kumara: What is the next category of guṇas?
Charaka: Then comes the Buddhi and Prayatnānta group of guṇas. Prayatnānta is a list that ends with Prayatna. These are properties of the inner life: buddhi (intellect), sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain), icchā (desire), dveṣa (aversion), and prayatna (effort). These too are classified as Guṇa, for they cannot have independent existence in the absence of Dravya such as manas (mind) and ātman (self).
Kumara: Inclusion of Buddhi under guṇas is confusing. Shouldn’t it be a Dravya? Just as mind and self?
Charaka: Another valid doubt. Some systems would indeed treat buddhi as a distinct principle along with mind and ahaṅkāra (ego-sense). In our medical ontology it is treated as a Guṇa, because it is thought that in the absence of self and mind, it does not exist independently. Again, this is a postulated entity. Hence its place in a specific category could be debatable. Ayurveda is more pragmatic, and hence theoretical accuracy is sometimes ignored. We indeed must work on such issues and bring clarity.
Kumara: Why are emotions and feelings such as pleasure, pain, and desire included under guṇa? Aren’t they products of how our mind processes our experiences?
Charaka: They are indeed mediated by the mind’s processing, yet they are classed as guṇa because they exist in the conscious ‘self’ as states. Just as heaviness or lightness belong to matter, pleasure and pain belong to experience. They are not independent dravya, nor mere fleeting karma, but properties that arise, endure for a time, and then fade. For this reason they are listed under guṇa. But you must note: the boundaries between categories such as dravya, guṇa, and karma are not always sharply fixed. They are aids to thought, not absolute divisions. At times the same entity may be described differently depending on the angle of inquiry.
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Karma, Kriyā, Kārya
Charaka now sets aside the stone and rice. He takes up a dried fruit of Madanaphala (emetic nut), its rough shell glistening faintly in the light.
Charaka: We have spoken of Dravya and Guṇa. But tell me, does a substance only sit idle, carrying properties like ornaments?
Bhargava: No, Master. Water in the river flows, fire burns, wind moves. Substances act.
Charaka: Correct. This brings us to Karma (function). Just as Guṇa resides in Dravya, so too does Karma. Every substance has a natural tendency to act in certain ways.
Aaruni: Master, is an action not the same as its effect? When fire burns wood, the action and the result seem one.
Charaka: Well, different terms are sometimes used interchangeably. But that creates confusion. They must be distinguished. Let us try and bring in clarity here. I propose the following:
Karma is the inherent capacity to act. It is the function of a Drvya.
Kriyā is the actual operation when that capacity is put into motion.
Kārya is the effect or outcome that follows.
Kumara: Can you give us an example that we can grasp?
Charaka (holding up the Madanaphala): This fruit is known as a vāmaka dravya (an emetic substance). Its karma is to produce vamana, the inherent tendency to cause vomiting. That capacity exists in the fruit whether you administer it or not.
Aaruni: Then when a patient takes the fruit and begins to vomit, what should it be called?
Charaka: That is Kriyā. The action in execution, unfolding in time.
Bhargava: We have heard of Kriyākāla. The timely interventions required to treat a disease.
Charaka: Yes. The physician acts at appropriate time. That is action in execution too.
Aaruni: And the relief the patient experiences after undergoing Vamana? What is it?
Charaka: That is kārya, the effect, the outcome sought in therapy.
Kumara: But Master, in the textbooks we often see the phrase Vamana Karma to describe the therapeutic procedure itself. Does this not cause confusion?
Charaka: Indeed. In common speech, physicians call the procedure Vamana Karma. But for clarity in analysis, we must keep the distinction:
Karma = inherent tendency (emetic potential of Madanaphala).
Kriyā = performed action (the act of vomiting when drug is given).
Kārya = effect (restoration of health).
Thus, karma is the cause in potential, kriyā is the cause in action, and kārya is the resultant effect in completion. If you confuse these, you may mistake potential for process, or process for result.
Bhargava: Master, could you give another everyday example?
Charaka: Oil has the karma of lubrication. When applied to the dry skin, through the act of Abhyanga, it is the kriyā: the act of massaging. The kārya is the softening of skin, the relief of dryness.
Kumara: So, in summary, karma is potential, kriyā is execution, kārya is result.
Charaka: Well spoken. Keep this triad clear in your mind, for much confusion in theory and practice arises from mixing them.
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Sāmānya and Viśeṣa
Charaka places the ghee, rice, and grain again in front of the pupils.
Charaka: We have spoken of Dravya, Guṇa, and Karma. Now tell me, if a person eats too much oil, ghee, and sweets, sleeps excessively, and avoids physical activity, what do you think happens?
Bhargava: He will grow obese over time.
Charaka: Why?
Aaruni: Because oil and ghee are smooth and oily, and those are the very properties of Kapha and Medas (fat). Even Madhura Rasa is Guru. They cause an increase in Kapha which leads to further sluggishness, dullness, excessive nourishment, excessive sleep and accumulation of more Medas. All add up and make him obese.
Charaka: Exactly. This is Sāmānya (similarity). That which is similar in Dravya, Guṇa, or Karma causes increase. “Like increases like.”
Kumara: And if we wish to reduce obesity what must we do?
Charaka: Then we apply Viśeṣa (difference). That which is opposite causes decrease. Dry foods, indulgence in physical exercise, frequent fasting, avoiding excessive sleep. Herbs with hot, light, rough and dry properties oppose the cold, heavy and oily nature of Kapha. Hence they cause a reduction in Kapha and thus in Medas and obesity.
Aaruni (raising a doubt): Master, earlier you said Doṣa are postulated entities. But here you speak of their increase and decrease. If they increase, should they not be material substances? How can a postulated entity increase or decrease?
Charaka: You touch the heart of the matter. Many reputed scholars stumble here. Listen carefully. When we speak of increase or decrease of Doṣa, we do not mean that a measurable quantity of matter increases or decreases. Increase and decrease are conceptual tools, postulated to explain symptoms.
Bhargava: Then what really increases?
Charaka: Severity and number of symptoms! Symptoms are themselves categories. For example, dryness of skin, roughness of voice, restlessness in movement, disturbed sleep, irregular hunger—when these symptoms cluster together, we speak of Vāta increase. Similarly, heaviness, lethargy, excess sleep, loss of mobility – these we call Kapha increase.
Kumara: So the symptom clusters are classified into different groups: increase or decrease of Doṣa. They are just the labels.
Charaka: Yes. But they have clinical utility.
Kumara: What is the clinical utility of these labels? Do they connect symptoms and causes?
Charaka: Rightly so. Indulgence in specific lifestyle and dietetic factors along with exposure to other causes of diseases lead to certain patterns of symptoms. The idea of Doṣa allows us to classify those patterns, trace causation, and predict outcomes.
Aaruni: So Doṣa are intellectual constructions!
Charaka: Yes, more precisely, they are explanatory constructs. They have pragmatic utility. They guide diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy. Just as time, space, self, and mind are treated as Dravya though not perceivable, so too Doṣa are accepted as Dravya for their explanatory power.
Bhargava: Then when we say Kapha increases by similarity and decreases by difference, what we really mean is that the pattern of symptoms classified under Kapha expands or contracts depending on lifestyle, diet and other causative factors and interventions?
Charaka: Exactly. You have captured the subtlety. Do not be trapped by materialism. Ayurveda is a pragmatic science. It uses conceptual categories to explain and predict.
Samavāya (inseparability)
Charaka lifts the stone again and places it on the palm of Kumara.
Charaka: Hold this stone. Tell me—what do you sense?
Kumara: It is heavy, hard, smooth.
Charaka: Can you hold the heaviness alone in your hand, apart from the stone?
Kumara: No, Master. Heaviness is only with the stone.
Charaka: Can you touch hardness without touching this stone?
Kumara: No. Hardness also belongs to the stone.
Charaka: This inseparability is what we call Samavāya (inherence). It is the eternal bond between Dravya (substance), Guṇa (property), and Karma (inherent action).
Aaruni: But Master, earlier we saw that some lists treat saṃyoga (conjunction) as a Guṇa. How is that different from Samavāya?
Charaka: A good doubt. Saṃyoga is a temporary joining of two independent things—like stone placed on rice. They may be separated. But Samavāya is inseparable, like heaviness in stone, or fluidity in water. You cannot peel them apart. Without Samavāya we would imagine that properties float free of substances. But you never see heat apart from fire, or fluidity apart from water. Samavāya thus safeguards coherence between categories by ensuring that attributes and actions remain grounded in their substratum.
Aaruni: Then, Master, can we say that wherever there is Dravya, there must be Guṇa and Karma?
Charaka: Yes. The three are inseparable. A Dravya without Guṇa or Karma cannot be conceived. That inseparability is explained by Samavāya.
Bhargava: And what of Doṣa? You said they are Dravya. Then their properties and actions too must exist inseparably?
Charaka: Correct. Vāta with its mobility and dryness, Pitta with its heat and sharpness, Kapha with its stability and heaviness—these are inseparable. Their functions too have been discussed. Though we may not see them as gross matter, their properties and actions are tied to them by Samavāya. This again, is how we postulate for explanatory and predictive utility.
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Closing Remarks
The sun is setting. The pupils sit silently, reflecting. Charaka looks at them steadily and gathers the strands together.
Charaka: We have walked through the six Padārtha: Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, and Samavāya. Each helps us classify what exists and connect cause to effect.
The students listen intently. Charaka pauses.
Charaka: Have you ever thought how are Guṇa and Karma determined in the first place? Suppose you want to identify the Guṇa and Karma of a new herb. How do you do this?
Kumara: This question has been on my mind since morning.
Charaka: This is what you must remember. The way to know what is unknown is by observation and testing. Look first to nature. If animals eat the herb or fruit freely, it suggests safety. It may be used as food. If they eat it only when they are ill, it is possibly a medicine. If they shun it, caution is required. It may be poison. Taste them carefully. Bitter may be toxic. Sweet may be normally safe.
Kumara: This is insightful. Makes sense.
Charaka: Then test gradually, with small doses, first in animals, observing carefully. If no harm is seen, proceed to humans, beginning with the healthy.
Bhargava: And what should we look for?
Charaka: Observe whether the herb relieves or produces symptoms. Does it alter sleep, hunger, stool, urine, strength, or clarity of mind? Does it bring heaviness or lightness, stimulation or calm? Herb that cures one condition but provokes another may have multiple actions. Only after repeated observation in different persons and contexts can its Guṇa and Karma be established.
Aaruni: So the “heaviness” of fish or of black gram is determined by what they do to the body, not by their actual weight! You used the stone as an example only to help us grasp the meaning, nothing more.
Charaka: Exactly. That is the point I want you to hold on to. Whatever we have discussed must rest on real observation and careful inference from patients. Logic and theory have no value if their predictions do not agree with what is observed. This is the essence of today’s lesson. You need not memorize every category and list, if you truly grasp this conclusion.
Aaruni: Then even the most abstract category must rest on repeated observation!
Charaka: Yes. Ayurveda is pragmatic. Guṇa and Karma are not guessed, but inferred through careful testing. Categories gain strength when tied to what can be seen, touched, measured, reasoned, and tested. Thus, ontology, epistemology, and practice remain inseparable: knowing is guided by observing, and observing refines knowing. That is how we turn experience into knowledge, and knowledge into healing.
The shade of the Peepal tree deepens. The lesson is complete.
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